Abstract. In this paper we i n troduce a formal approach for the speci cation of safety-critical embedded systems. The speci cation formalisms Z and statecharts are integrated under a suitable structural model. The combined approach uses the advantages of the formalisms while avoiding their disadvantages. The di erent formalisms yield di erent, compatible views on the system: the functional view describing data and data-transformation, the reactive view, describing the system's reaction upon external stimuli, and the structural view, describing the components of the system and their interaction. The combination is discussed presenting parts of a case study: a tra c light control system. The case study is oriented at original planning documents. Besides its safety-and real-time-aspects, the case study is particularly interesting because structuring and reuse is of considerable importance in this example.
Introduction
Embedded systems are permanently increasing in size, complexity and responsibility. F ailures of the control software can have disastrous consequences and, due to this, safety 18 of the software is becoming more and more important. In addition, embedded systems raise problems of concurrency, h a ve t o obey real-time requirements, and usually reside in a heterogeneous environment. This stresses the need of an adequate software speci cation technique and a suitable development method for large-scale safety-critical embedded systems. The used speci cation formalisms need to be comprehensive, expressive, and precise. We are using statecharts, an extension of nite automata, to describe reactive behaviors; because of its clear depiction of a system's reaction and states. For the data and data-transformations we are using the Z speci cation language because of its mathematical-like notation and expressiveness.
Instead of describing the whole system in one speci cation formalism, we use di erent formalisms to specify di erent aspects of the system, exploiting the advantages and avoiding the disadvantages of the particular formalisms; e.g. dynamic aspects like control ow can not be expressed very descriptive in Z, while the statecharts formalism provides only limited support for the description of data.
The structural view describes the components of the system and their relations with each other and their environment. Typically some variant o f data ow diagrams 8 is used for this purpose. In the dynamic view the reaction of the system and its components to internal and external stimuli is speci ed. Such behavior can be described intuitively using state automata. The functional view describes data, data invariants and data transformations of the system and its components. The data transformations are controlled by the speci cation of the dynamic view. For the speci cation of the functional view, data type speci cation languages are an adequate tool.
The main emphasis of this work is the presentation of the case study|the speci cation of a tra c light system with statecharts and Z. The case study, the combination called SZ as well as veri cation and validation techniques are investigated in detail in the Espress project 1 . Methodological aspects of the Espress project are presented in 11 .
Speci cation Technique
We represent a n e m bedded system as a collection of synchronous, communicating processes. Each process has a data space, an interface for the communication with other processes or the environment, and a statechart determining how it reacts upon external stimuli.
The description of a process is given by the speci cation of so called process classes. A process class describes a set of processes with common behavior. This description a process-class includes the structure of the process, i.e. its subprocesses, their communication relations, and the processes the speci ed process is linked to via associations. The description consists in its interface, its local variables, its dynamic behavior, its con guration, predicates and operations over its variables, as well as behavioral constraints. This combination is discussed in detail in 2 , the di erent views are depicted in Figure 1 .
The structure of a process is depicted in a so called con guration diagram. Processes communicate via shared variables and valued events. A process can have several interfaces called ports to read and write variables shared with other processes. In the con guration diagram, communication relations between processes are established by linking ports of di erent processes together. The structure and the interfaces of a process together are forming the architectural view of a process.
A process is storing, transforming, and exchanging data. This data is speci ed in the functional description of the process, using the Z language We distinguish local and shared data. The local data is described in so called DATA-schemas, whereas shared data is stored in PORT-schemas. Data transformation can be carried out via operations. I n a n Op-schema, the input-output relation of an operation is speci ed in Z. The behavior of a process, i.e. the actions it performs during its lifetime, are subject to the statecharts 12 in the dynamic view. We are using the Statemate 13 tool to support the graphical languages used. Thus, for statecharts, the Statemate syntax and semantics 15,14 are adopted. The con gurations are expressed with a subset of Statemate's activity-charts. Nevertheless, we specify the guards and actions of the statechart transitions in Z. The guards are predicates over a process's data space and the actions are operations over the data space.
Especially in the early development phases, it might not be possible or adequate to describe the process behavior in an operational manner, i.e. by using statecharts. Therefore, we express behavioral requirements particularly safety requirements in temporal logic. Here, we are using the logic introduced in 5 . These temporal requirements can later be implemented" by a statechart. Thus, a process can as well include an abstract speci cation of behavioral constraints and requirements as a concrete implementation. It becomes a natural proof obligation in the development process to show that the implementation ful lls the constraints and requirements.
The semantics of a combined speci cation is a set of processes that is ordered in a tree-like structure according to the speci cation's con guration diagrams. The processes are connected via ports, allowing them to access and exchange the values of their external variables. The static semantics of a process is determined according to the Z semantics by the bindings of the process variables, by the statechart status i.e. the set of statecharts states the process currently resides in, and recursively by the static semantics of the process's aggregated processes. The dynamic semantics of a process is given by the Statemate semantics described in 14 . The parallel statecharts of the processes are executed synchronously. Changes that occur during one step are visible only in the following step. We are applying the asynchronous time model of Statemate. W e w ant to point out that the semantics of the basis formalisms Z and statecharts are preserved in the combined speci cation. This enables us to reuse existing tools for Z and Statecharts. Note that we do not aim at translating one formalism into the other, but rather use them in a supplemental way.
The Case Study: A Tra c Light System
In this case study we describe a fault tolerant tra c light system TLS. The task of the TLS consists of 1 steering the signal heads 2 according to a given program functionality, and 2 guaranteeing a safe signal situation on the junction, even in case of signal head failure safety. To reduce complexity, this speci cation separates the functional and the safety aspects into di erent components. The means of structuring of the used speci cation formalism support this approach and allow a modular speci cation. A TLS has to comply to several norms and laws; for this case study the German Road Tra c Law and the German norms 9,10 are relevant. The requirements for a particular junction are given in the planning documents, made by an engineer's o ce. This speci cation is based on authentic planning documents of an existing junction.
The planning documents include the essential local informations for the tra c junction such as the road infrastructure, road markings, sidewalks, bike-ways, signing, signal heads, and detectors see Figure 2 . The street from north-east to south-west is the main road. The signal heads are numbered, the detectors induction loops and pedestrian push buttons are carrying numbers with a leading D". The detectors are measuring the requirements of the road users. These requirements are in uencing the control of the tra c light system, allowing to react in a exible way o n c hanging tra c volumes.
We model the signal heads of the TLS in Z as an enumeration type. The signal heads have di erent lamps, modeled as Lamp. The signal heads that control the same tra c ows, are grouped together to signal groups. A signal group consists of a set of signal heads that, in absence of failure, indicate the same signal. In our tra c junction we h a ve eleven signal groups v denotes vehicle, p pedestrian, m the main road, and s the side road. are in con ict. This is expressed by the relation con ict. The con ict relation is irre exive and symmetric. Although not in con ict, bending tra c ows may still interfere with non-bending. The road tra c law determines the priority relation between two tra c ows with a common con ict area that might pass the junction at the same time. Besides not being opened at the same time, con icting tra c ows have to obey to their intergreen time. The intergreen time between two con icting tra c streams speci es how long the vacating tra c stream has to be blocked until the starting stream can be opened. The intergreen time table Fig. 3 , shows the intergreen times as given in the planning documents for all pairs of con icting signal groups. It shows the necessary intergreen times between starting abscissa and vacating ordinate tra c streams.
The intergreen time table is modeled in Z as a function that maps a pair of con icting signal groups to its intergreen time. IGTgrp 1 ; grp 2 denotes the time grp 1 has to be closed before grp 2 may be opened.
IGT : con ict ! TIME
Structure of the Tra c Light Control System
We describe our system as a hierarchical set of interacting processes. The top level process is called TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROL. Its con guration shows how it is divided into four aggregated processes as well as the interfaces between the processes and their environment. Here, the environment consists of the external tra c facilities, such as the signal heads and detectors of the system. The processes are connected via arrows that are labeled with port names. The processes communicate via the variables declared in their ports. These ports are speci ed in the process classes of the processes. In the Table   following we give a short description of the four aggregates of the top-level process:
The VEHICLE ACTUATED CONTROL realizes the tra c control algorithm, i.e., it computes when the lamps of the signal heads are to be switched on or o and sends the relevant signals. The SAFEGUARD guarantees the safety of the tra c junction. If an unsafe signal indication occurs due to hardware or software failure, the safeguard has to take counter action. If, for example, a red light breaks, the safeguard and the suppression have t o decide whether the resulting signal indication is still safe. If it is not, it has to take measures to reestablish a safe indication. If an unsafe signal indication is detected, the suppression tries to reestablish safety in, e.g. switching defective signal heads whereas the safe guard shuts o the entire TLS if an unsafe situation is imminent to last longer than 0.3 seconds. The safe guard is discussed in detail in section 3.3.
Signals that are sent b y the control might i n terfere with measures taken by the SAFEGUARD while handling failures. Such signals are ltered out by the SIGNAL SUPPRESSION. Moreover, the SIGNAL SUPPRESSION suppresses all signals that would lead to an unsafe situation of the junction. By that, safety can be ensured independently of the VEHICLE ACTU-ATED CONTROL. The signals of the system's detectors induction loops and pedestrian push buttons are recorded and prepared for the control by the DETECTOR ACQUISITION, because these detector values serve as parameters for the vehicle actuated control.
There are four interfaces between the tra c control system and the external tra c facilities: The signals, indicated to the road users, are transmitted via the port ACTUAL VALUES. They are assumed to be measurable in a fail-safe way and can be always 
The Control Program
In the process class VEHICLE ACTUATED CONTROL, the control algorithm is speci ed. It switches between di erent phases. A phase can be characterized by the set of signal groups that are opened together during this phase. In many tra c light systems the order and duration of the phases is prede ned xed-time control. Nevertheless, the control program, presented here, is driven by the actual tra c, measured by the induction loops and the pedestrian push buttons. It allows phase transitions between all phases. Note that the program has two rather unusual phases: in phase0 all signal groups are closed and in phase1 only the pedestrians have green. Obviously, groups that are in the same phase must not be in con ict. During a phase transition, the signal groups are switched according to the phase transition tables in the planning documents Figure 4 . The phase transition table denotes for each signal group the signaling over the time measured in seconds. The tra c ows that are blocked in the new phase are closed and the ows that are to be opened are given green. The phase transition tables assure that the intergreen times are not violated during a phase transition.
In Figure 4 , the phase transition table from phase 1 to phase 2 is shown. Initially, all pedestrian signal heads indicate green. One second after the beginning of the phase transition, signal group 27 28 is switched to red, three seconds later signal group 25 26 follows and so on.
The internal state variables of a process class are declared in a DATA schema. The variables from and to are used to record the actually desired phase transition. The variable tp of type TIME keeps track of the progress of the actual phase transition, i.e. the column of the phase transition table. The relation Transition describes the possible phase transitions, where phase0; phase1 stands for the transition from phase 0 to phase 1. 3 In the statechart, the transition labels are of the form cond =action, where cond is a condition speci ed in a Z schema or in Statemate syntax and action is a Z operation. The transition res if the condition is true; the action is executed then. 
The Safeguard
The safeguard guarantees the safety of the system. It works independently from the other parts and shuts the TLS o if an unsafe situation has been encountered. According to the norm DIN VDE 0832 9 , the TLS must not stay longer than 0.3 seconds in an unsafe situation. For the safeguard, rstly the requirements are speci ed using abstract temporal formulae. Then, these formulae are translated into more concrete, non-temporal predicates and a statechart. Here, we present three of the TLS's safety requirements. The signal heads sensor their own state, i.e. which bulbs are shining or not and make these values available to the safeguard. The safeguard reads these values through its port ACTUAL VALUES. F or the safety consideration, we assume that the actual values are supplied immediately with no time delay. For the concrete implementation, this requirement can be weakened. If the TLS is to be shut o , the safeguard sets the variable OFF in the port SHUT OFF to True.
We model the actual signal stage of the junction as a function, assigning to each set of signal heads the set of on-lamps. Based on the signaling situation, the signal groups are partitioned into open i.e. showing green, yellow, etc., closed i.e. showing red, and free i.e. are o . Note that normally signal heads of the same group should show the same signals, which might not be true in case of an defective signal heads. It might also happen that the green and red lights of one set of signal heads are on simultaneously. In these situations, the partition of the signal groups is quite intricate. Moreover the actual assessment sometimes changes with local regulations. We therefore omit a precise de nition here. MAX FAIL TIME : TIME SAMPLING RATE : TIME Basing on the actual signal stage, the TLS has to judge whether the junction is in a safe situation or not. The safe guard introduces a predicate safe : B , denoting whether the junction is in a safe situation in this particular state or not. In fact, the safety conditions presented here discriminate only states that are de nitely not safe. We rstly de ne for each safety requirement the auxiliary schemas Con ict Abs, Priority Abs, and ObeysIGT Abs. They are then used to formulate the safety requirement for the class SAFEGUARD.
We are using discrete interval logic to describe the safety requirements. A complete description of its syntax and semantics is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we only give a short introduction. The logic can be seen as a discrete variant of the Duration Calculus 7 adopted for Z. It is presented in 5 . dx = 0e denotes an interval where x equals zero all the time. By dx 0e a dx 0e an interval is denoted, where x is greater zero in the beginning and is less than zero immediately afterwards. somewhere dx = 0 e denotes an interval where for some sub-interval x = 0. The formula dx = 0 e t describes an interval shorter than t, where x equals zero. The rst safety requirement Con ict Abs states that the junction is unsafe if two con icting signal groups are opened at the same time, i.e., there is no sub-interval in which a con icting pair of signal groups grp 1 ; grp 2 2 con ict is opened and safe = True.
The second safety requirement Priority Abs states that a prioritized signal group must not be opened while a signal group of lower priority is open. A group has priority o ver another one, if the two groups can be open simultaneously i.e. are not in con ict, but their tra c ows interfere. This is, e.g., the case for bending vehicles and pedestrians. In this case the pedestrians have priority o ver the vehicles and the pedestrian ow m ust not be opened while the vehicles are already driving.
The third safety requirement ObeysIGT Abs denotes that an opening signal group must obey to the intergreen time table, i.e., all con icting signal groups have to be closed for at least their intergreen time before the group is opened.
If the TLS enters an unsafe situation the program has to react and reestablish safety within MAX FAIL TIME. W e can now formulate the central safety requirement Safety Abs for the TLS. Note that the actual value of MAX FAIL TIME depends on how fast the hardware can shut o the system, thus depends on the hardware environment the control software is embedded in. The SAFEGUARD has to obey to the three safety conditions and there must not be any sub-interval with safe = False for more than MAX FAIL TIME dsafe = Falsee MAX FAIL TIME . The behavior requirement for the SAFEGUARD says that the TLS has to obey to Safety Abs or has to be shut o . Note that Con ict Abs, Priority Abs, ObeysIGT Abs, and Safety Abs are auxiliary schemas whereas a box labeled PROPERTY denotes a direct requirement for the behavior of the class.
SAFEGUARD
DYNAMIC Safety Abs GroupStates; SAFE Con ict Abs^ObeysIGT Abs^Priority Abs : somewhere dsafe = Falsee MAX FAIL TIME PROPERTY DYNAMIC GroupStates; SAFE Safety Abs _ Safety Abs a dOFF = Truee After having speci ed the requirements of the safeguard we can implement them. The safeguard needs to store the time when a signal group was closed and which signal groups have just been opened resp. closed. The function blocking time assigns to each closed signal group the time it was closed. The set last step opened holds all newly opened signal groups. Analogously, last step closed holds all newly closed groups. The operation UP-DATE BLOCKING TIME 4 updates these variables in SAMPLING RATE intervals. 4 Note that in this operation dom blocking time is set of signal groups closed in the previous step, whereas closed holds the current value. Therefore, closed n dom blocking time denotes the signal groups that were recently opened and are closed now. Correspondingly, opened dom blocking time denotes the signal groups that were closed in the last step and are opened now. opened C blocking time restricts the domain of blocking time to opened. Thus, the operation restricts blocking time to the closed groups and adds the newly closed groups related to the current time Time Meanwhile, it periodical reads the actual values sent by the external facilities and updates blocking time and last step opened accordingly. The statechart has to implement the behavior constraint of the process, i.e. the set of observable runs it de nes has to be a subset of the set de ned by the behavior constraint. Here, we h a ve to prove that inSAFE safe = True, where inSAFE denotes that the statechart state SAFE is active.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a ve presented a combination of formal speci cation techniques with a well-known structuring technique that has been successfully applied in software engineering. We are using Z and statecharts as basis formalisms for expressing the functional and reactive behavior of embedded systems. Both formalisms have found broad acceptance in the research area as well as in industry. The presented combination exploits the advantages of each formalism. Note that in this approach the semantics of the basic formalisms are preserved, which i s v ery important for tool reuse. In contrast, in 22,6 the Statemate semantics were not preserved.
The usage of Z as language for the description of the functional aspects has turned out to be superior to e.g. the Statemate data description language 15 , especially for the formulation of data invariants and safety requirements, and for the rather complex data-items as the phase transition table. The dynamic behavior of a process could be modeled very naturally with statecharts. Its graphical nature in contrast to other process description languages and combinations of speci cation languages like 17,19,1,20,16 provides a good overview over the di erent states and possible state transitions of a process. The architectural view was described by data ow diagrams. Here, a more powerful notation would have been helpful, supporting genericity in order to reuse components as well as collections of processes.
Supplementing Z with temporal logic and an adequate satisfaction relation for statecharts and temporal logic is still subject to further research. Nevertheless, we believe that the case study shows impressively the advantage of this approach. Within the Espress project, work on the development of tools to support the presented technique and method is investigated. This includes type-checking, execution of Z speci cations, and veri cation and validation of combined speci cations. With that, it should be possible to simulate and analyze the model extensively.
With the formalization of safety requirements we were able to discover ambiguities and unprecise formulations in the natural language speci cation. We believe that the precise formulation of safety requirements in an early development phase will turn out to be very helpful to increase the developer's understanding of the problem, avoiding misconceptions and design errors caused by a m biguous or incomplete requirements.
The applicability of our approach has been demonstrated in a case-study where a tra c light system has been speci ed 3,4 . Even if only parts of the case study could be presented here the entire speci cation contains over 70 pages, we found the division of a system into di erent views and the formulation of explicit safety requirements convincing for the speci cation of safety-critical embedded systems.
